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EDUCATING DURING A PANDEMIC: THE ROLE OF 
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN GOING BACK TO SCHOOL 
 
By Robert Bruno and Nicholas Christen 
 
 
Dr. Robert Bruno is Professor of Labor and Employment Relations at the University of Illinois 
School of Labor and Employment Relations, Urbana-Champaign, and Director of the 
university’s Labor Education Program and Project for Middle Class Renewal. He is the author 
of numerous journal articles, policy reports, and books: Steelworker Alley: How Class Works in 
Youngstown; Reforming the Chicago Teamsters: The Local 705 Story; Justified by Work: Identity 
and the Meaning of Faith in Chicago’s Working-Class Churches; and, with co-author Steven K. 
Ashby, A Fight for The Soul of Public Education: The Chicago Teachers Strike. 
 
Nicholas Christen is an attorney and Strategic Research Director at the Illinois Federation of 
Teachers. He concentrates his practice in labor and employment law, and his experience 
includes collective bargaining and arbitration on behalf of public and private employees, as well 
as litigation before the National Labor Relations Board and the Illinois Educational Labor 
Relations Board. He is also an adjunct professor in the University of Illinois School of Labor and 
Employment Relations. 
 
I.  Introduction 
 
At the beginning of the 2020 academic year, as the nation continued to wrestle 
with a surging escalation of coronavirus cases, only a small number of Illinois’s 
public preschoolers to 12th grade students were fully receiving instruction by 
attending school in person. A somewhat larger, but still relatively small group, 
were spending some days or partial days in person at school. However, the vast 
majority of students were not going to school in person at all, but instead taking 
classes fully remotely (usually online). Illinois’s experience closely tracked with 
most of the rest of the country. The outcome was not what state education 
officials expected or consistently and strenuously proffered. Despite the release of 
multiple state guidance documents on schools and Covid-19, school openings 
were fraught with uncertainty. How and why schools reopened the way they did 
and the multivariant roles that the Illinois Federation of Teachers (IFT) and 
Illinois Education Association (IEA) played in those decisions, and the impact 
state health guidance had on labor relations, are the subject of this article.1 
 
Schools across the state were confronted with a vexing problem: how to reopen 
safely while a highly contagious and deadly virus was still rampant. The situation 
was unprecedented. In the spring of 2020 schools nationwide suddenly shut 
down. Roughly 50 million kids were sent home to shelter. National health data 
showed that school-age kids, particularly elementary school-age kids, had fewer 
infections and were perhaps less likely to infect than older age groups.2 But the 
scientific information on the infectious rates among young people was 
conditional and preliminary at best. What would happen were Illinois to open the 
doors to 2 million public school kids? Schools that were on average over 40 years 
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old, badly in need of air quality retrofitting, with narrow hallways, and built to 
hold large groups in tight, intimate spaces, were not designed for educating kids 
during a pandemic. Students and roughly 130,000 teachers,3 plus principals and 
noncertified staff in just under 4,000 schools, would have to be kept safe.4 Yet, no 
one knew for certain how, and the ones who would have been expected to provide 
direction were not doing so. 
 
Nonetheless, the 2020–21 academic year would start. While state agencies such 
as the Illinois Department of Public Health (IDPH) and the Illinois State Board of 
Education (ISBE) provided in-depth guidance, the state decided to let individual 
school districts determine the modality of instruction for their students. This 
meant that school district administrators, school boards, and unionized 
teachers—none with credentials as infectious disease experts—would have to 
decide how to go back to school. One national study found that teacher union 
strength was a primary driver of how school districts approached reopening.5 
Infectious disease science was important to the public in determining school 
district reopening decisions, but it proved extremely difficult to access and apply. 
Instead, teacher unions and school boards used the deliberative spaces that 
collective bargaining provided to shape reopening plans. 
 
No matter the nature of the plan, whether fully remote or fully in-person, the 
collective bargaining process provided the platform for determining how children 
would be educated. In many cases, the negotiations were collaborative and 
produced impressively codified arrangements for instruction that protected 
student and teacher health by creating enforceable guidelines that required face 
coverings, social distancing, and sanitation measures recommended by IDPH and 
ISBE. Along with the variables that influenced school reopening plans, this paper 
will discuss the ways districts and unions agreed to work together to educate 
children. Where, however, employment relationships were more hostile, threats 
and actual forms of teacher resistance affirmed Michigan State University 
Professor Katharine Strunk’s realization that “unions have made it pretty clear 
that they do not want teachers back in school buildings until they’re 100 percent 
sure they’re safe.”6 
 
II.  A Summer of Uncertainty 
 
The shuttering of Illinois schools in March 2020 pursuant to Governor J.B. 
Pritzker’s emergency order unquestionably reduced the community spread of 
Covid-19 cases.7 It also forced schools to immediately invent and implement 
unimagined forms of remote learning. Districts, which had previously developed 
“e-learning” plans in case of a few “emergency snow days,” had to quickly convert 
their classroom-based instruction into a mix of weekly paper packets and online 
instruction for the remainder of the academic year. ISBE acknowledged the 
trauma caused by the transition: “The COVID-19 pandemic wrought a drastic and 
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unexpected upheaval on Illinois schools and districts.”8 
 
The agency was most likely reflecting the generous understanding educators and 
families had for the impossible predicament that schools found themselves in 
over the last third of the school year, in asserting that with “creativity, 
adaptability, and dedication, Illinois’ leaders, educators, families, and students 
rose to the challenge.”9 In an unprecedented action ISBE, along with the 
Governor’s office, IFT, IEA, the Illinois Association of School Administrators 
(IASA), and the Illinois Principal’s Association (IPA) developed a Joint Statement 
that gave statewide guidance on the suspension of in-person learning.10 
The statement made several important points relating to providing continuity of 
education and necessary technology, as well as providing meals to students who 
would normally receive free or reduced breakfast and lunch at school.11 It also 
guaranteed that no district would lose any state “Evidence Based Funding” (EBF) 
because students were engaged in remote learning.12 
 
Fearing the switch to remote learning could lead to a lack of work and potential 
layoffs, the unions were able to negotiate language in the Joint Statement that 
made it clear—at least for the rest of the 2019–20 school year—that all school 
district employees on the district’s payroll would receive their normal pay and 
benefits. In exchange, the unions agreed that districts could “expect school 
district employees to participate in work activities in some form,” though “[t]he 
concrete details of the work, including stipend work, that will occur during this 
timeframe must be worked out through mutual agreement…”13 but that 
“[e]mployers should not require any more employees than absolutely necessary 
to come to school.”14 The statement also made it clear that all timelines in the 
school code relating to layoffs, evaluations, and tenure acquisition were not 
subject to change absent legislative involvement. 
 
While some school systems certainly maintained a semblance of quality 
instruction most, at best, muddled through. National surveys found that schools 
quickly converted to online learning and that between 95 to 99 percent of 
teachers were facilitating remote instruction.15 However, two-thirds to three-
quarters of teachers also acknowledged that their “students were less engaged 
during remote instruction than before the pandemic.”16 One analysis found that 
the median number of weekly hours students spent in contact with teachers was 
two.17 The absence of any real objective analysis on quality did not obscure the 
conventional opinion that remote learning in the spring across the country was at 
best “scattered and chaotic.”18 
 
Therefore, it was not a surprise when ISBE’s and IDPH’s joint 2020–21 school 
year guidance stated, “Schools and districts are encouraged to provide completely 
in-person instruction for all students in Phase 4, provided that the school is able 
to comply with capacity limits and implement social distancing measures.”19 
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Phase 4 was in reference to Governor Pritzker’s “Restore Illinois” five-phase plan 
to reopen the state, including schools, while “guided by health metrics and with 
distinct business, education, and recreation activities characterizing each 
phase.”20 In announcing the return to school, Pritzker emphasized that, 
“[c]lassroom learning provides necessary opportunities for our students to learn, 
socialize, and grow. The benefits of in-person instruction can’t be overstated.”21  
While agreeing that classroom learning was preferred, the teacher unions’ 
response to the governor’s pronouncement was immediate and critical. At nearly 
the same moment that ISBE’s guidance went public, IFT and IEA issued a joint 
press release, saying:  
 
The guidelines ISBE released today provide a road map as we return to in-
person instruction, but they don’t address some of the most pressing 
concerns that make it difficult to social distance appropriately and monitor 
the health and well-being of all our education support staff, teachers, and 
students. We are especially concerned about the lack of personal protective 
equipment and providing a safe learning environment.”22 
 
Throughout the summer IEA and IFT had been part of a Transition Advisory 
Workgroup to develop an approach to opening schools. Union leadership was 
regularly included on calls with ISBE and the governor’s office. In their press 
statement the unions acknowledged the “collaborative relationship we’ve had 
with ISBE,” 23 but also signaled unhappiness with the guidance: “It is imperative 
that as plans are developed for the year, we get a chance to ensure the safety of 
our students and our members, that some of our biggest concerns in this 
document are addressed, including resources and collective bargaining.”24 
 
The state’s strong preference for returning students to their classrooms was 
unmistakable. Repeatedly, the guidance document stressed, “In-person 
instruction is strongly encouraged” and ISBE “urges schools and districts to plan 
for and implement the transition to in-person instruction.” 25 Reading the 
guidance, local school administrators, boards of education and school staff 
couldn’t miss that ISBE “strongly encourages in-person instruction for students 
to the greatest extent possible.”26 The guidance further noted, “In-person 
instruction should be prioritized for English Learners,”27 and “In-person 
instruction should be prioritized for students with IEPs, English Learners, and 
students under the age of 13.”28 Reacting to the mixed experience that many 
students had with e-learning in the spring, ISBE even suggested a wider student 
application for complete in-person instruction for “those who have had greater 
difficulty learning remotely.”29 
 
The transition document also included important health protocols for conducting 
classroom teaching. Complete in-person instruction was being recommended but 
the state was clear that its guidance did not “signify a return to pre-pandemic 
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operations.”30 There was no substitute for the virtuous “effect of face-to-face 
interactions and instruction between teachers and students,” but it needed to 
happen only while “keeping health and safety as the number one priority.”31 
Schools should open but “social distancing, face coverings, enhanced sanitation 
measures, and other accommodations will be necessary to ensure the safety of 
students, staff, and their families.”32 The document’s declared intent was to 
“guide districts in transitioning back to in-person learning while holding 
paramount the health and safety of students and communities.”33 
 
Despite ISBE’s goal, an omnibus education law passed during the abbreviated 
2020 spring legislative session recognized the possibility that some school 
districts could not open their buildings to students.34 The legislation therefore 
authorized the option of “Remote and Blended Remote Learning Days.”35 Based 
on local conditions districts could choose to offer fully online learning or a hybrid 
of in-person and remote instruction.36 The possible calibrations were numerous, 
but the idea was to allow local school agencies to maximize classroom teaching 
while also meeting the Covid-19 safety measures recommended by IDPH and 
local county health officials. District opening plans were influenced by a 
substantial array of school and non-school based factors. Among the school 
variables were financial resources, enrollment, grades taught, capital 
infrastructure (i.e., classroom space, technology, and ventilation system quality), 
access to personal protective equipment (e.g., face masks, shields, gloves) and 
staffing assignment dimensions (i.e., age and health conditions of teachers, 
number of teachers on leave, teacher certifications). Community elements 
included average household income, racial demographics, infection rates, and 
health care services. 
 
What the state’s guidance did not include was a directive from either IDPH or the 
governor’s office about how schools would open. Unlike a number of states, 
Illinois declined to implement a centralized approach to school openings when 
Governor Pritzker lifted the ban on in-person instruction.37 For example, in 
Florida, Governor Ron DeSantis and the Department of Education had pushed 
schools to reopen in the fall, with the state’s education commissioner issuing an 
emergency order mandating all “brick-and-mortar schools” reopen for in-person 
instruction at least five days a week by August 31.38 And in Iowa, Governor Kim 
Reynolds issued a mandate that all schools provide at least 50% in-person 
instruction this year, citing a law passed by the state legislature.39 In both cases, 
the unions fought back, winning a statewide temporary injunction in Florida,40 
but losing statewide in Iowa.41 
 
In Illinois, instead of a statewide mandate, IDPH issued extensive safety 
recommendations for mitigating the rate of infection and the governor mandated 
wearing facemasks and required that schools ensure that students maintain “at 
least six foot [of] social distance from other individuals.”42 School districts were 
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given the discretion or “local control” to determine how to restart school. The 
concept of local control is highly prized by district administrators who often chafe 
at state mandates that are far too often not funded by the state legislature. School 
boards are no less insistent on decentralized decision-making. As part of its 
annual meeting, the Illinois Association of School Boards approves “belief 
statements” that express the organization’s values. One such “belief” was eerily 
prescient: “local boards of education should be prepared for possible public 
health crises “such as an Avian flu pandemic . . . [and] are encouraged to adopt 
proactive pandemic preparedness strategies.”43 However, defaulting authority on 
reopening schools to local educators during a public health crisis severely 
subverted the utility of local control. Despite having no expertise in infectious 
disease control, school district leaders and teacher unions were left with the 
agonizing and daunting burden of deciding when it was safe to go back into the 
classroom. 
  
Throwing some doubt onto the enforceability of the ISBE guidance, a few private 
schools announced that they would not comply with the governor’s COVID-19 
Executive Orders. The schools informed the State of Illinois that they would not 
comply because they believed the orders had been issued without authority and 
that they, the schools, would determine what, if any, health and safety protocols 
they would implement. In response, State of Illinois officials brought suit.44 The 
IFT and IEA filed an amicus brief supporting the State’s suit, explaining the harm 
involved in a policy of “individual choice” regarding the use of face coverings and 
other protections and the state’s substantial interest in widespread adherence to 
the governor’s guidance. The IFT and IEA further explained that if schools fail to 
enforce state public health requirements intended to reduce the likelihood of 
transmission, there is a substantial risk of grave harm to teachers, students, 
administrators, staff, their loved ones and associates, and the broader public.45 
The court agreed with the state and IFT/IEA position, finding that Pritzker’s 
orders were validly issued.46 The court concluded that state officials had 
established that absent an injunction the virus would continue to spread causing 
increased harm to the community at large, up to and including varying degrees of 
sickness, including death.47 
 
Discussions on school reopening plans were unfolding as studies were emerging 
that Covid-19 cases among children were climbing. The American Academy of 
Pediatrics reported that from July 9 to August 9 there was a 90 percent jump, 
representing a staggering “infection rate of 501 for every 100,000 children.”48 
Another study suggested that most people lived in areas where transmissions 
rates were high enough to likely trigger outbreaks in schools with at least 500 
students.49 A retrospective examination of school closures in the spring 
associated approximately 1.37 million fewer coronavirus cases with system-wide 
shutdowns. 50 The trajectory around the virus’ pathology among school-aged 
children drove school employee concerns upward. In late July a national survey 
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found that fewer than half of teachers, principals and district leaders supported a 
return to fulltime, in-person instruction in the fall.51 Health fears were amplified 
by the unknown long-term effects of even a mild case of infection. 
 
When coronavirus cases in Illinois spiked one month later the number of 
teachers and district administrators comfortable with any classroom teaching fell 
accordingly.52 It was a rational response. The Kaiser Family Foundation 
estimated that roughly a quarter of teachers (about 1.47 million people), had a 
condition that put them at “higher risk of serious illness from coronavirus.” They 
went on to underscore that for “higher-risk teachers, failure to achieve safe 
working conditions could have very serious results.”53 
 
Figuring out the best model to open in the fall was never going to be easy. 
However, the emerging research on children and schools cast a deeply cautious 
specter on discussions between teacher unions and school districts. Leery of 
reopening plans that did not account for the health and safety of students and 
staff, the IFT and IEA released a statement that emphasized a willingness to work 
with school districts on reopening plans, but that also established the possibility 
of “safety strikes,” saying: 
 
We are working to ensure that any district providing in-person instruction 
in Illinois is prepared and able to abide by the safety measures outlined by 
the state, the federal government, and medical professionals. If those 
measures are not met, we will do everything we can to protect our 
students and those who care for them – teachers and professors, bus 
drivers, classroom aides, secretaries, building janitors and everyone in 
between. No avenue or action is off the table – the courts, the Illinois 
Educational Labor Relations Board - nothing, including health and safety 
strikes. The entire weight of the IEA and the IFT will be used in whatever 
way is necessary to protect the students and the staff who educate them.54  
 
III.  A Teacher Union Initiative to Establish Safety Standards 
 
Troubled by the lack of a uniform standard for opening schools safely, the IEA 
took a novel step. In July the union partnered with the Illinois Chapter of the 
American Academy of Pediatrics (ICAAP) to review school plans submitted by 
IEA UniServ Directors (UDs). 55 The UDs were working with local union 
presidents who felt their districts were planning to return students and staff to 
in-person schooling under unsafe conditions. In situations where an IEA local 
believed its district had put forward an unsafe plan or where no actual plan 
existed, the UD with the support of the local leadership had the option of 
submitting responses to a questionnaire and a summary of the working 
conditions to an ICAAP review panel. 
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Along with describing the current district plan for "return to learning," questions 
addressed the district’s collaboration with the union and its health and safety 
credentials, including the following: “Was the Association involved with the 
district in making the plan?” and “Has the plan been reviewed or approved by 
your local Department of Public Health?”56 Union officials had the option of 
checking “YES” or “NO” next to the pieces of the plan which did or did not meet 
safety standards for a return to in-person education. Once submitted a panel of 
pediatricians reviewed the plans and returned them with statements regarding 
their level of safety. 
 
The panel assessed the district’s plan on four metrics: “Community Benchmarks” 
(i.e., community spread of the virus), “Healthy Classroom” (i.e., wearing masks, 
using hand sanitizers, social distancing, small cohorts), “Healthy Buildings” (i.e., 
cleaning protocols), and “Enforcement” (i.e., having a policy on Covid-19 
practices). Depending on how the district rated on each of the measures the 
pediatricians would offer a “Final Recommendation.” Either the plan would get 
approval or if it lacked the requisite safety elements the union would be notified 
that “[t]he plan as described is insufficient to substantially mitigate risk of 
transmission of COVID-19 without clarification of the above items.” The finding 
would then conclude: “We recommend schools not open, unless the 
recommended modifications/clarifications are made to protect the health and 
safety of students and staff.”57 In the case of a failed review, the expectation was 
that the union local would bring the panel’s findings to the district’s board of 
education in the hopes of modifying the plan. 
 
However, despite the involvement of the ICAAP only a small number of IEA 
locals utilized the procedure. Perhaps because most locals were not presented 
with unsafe plans or the leaders didn’t support utilizing the panel review to 
impact the district’s plans, the involvement of the pediatric body did not produce 
a more uniform standard to safely reopen schools. In some cases, an ICAAP 
report was sent to the superintendent and the board, and modifications were 
made to the school plan. In other instances the Association simply received no 
response. The districts’ silence had the effect of keeping some schools in-person 
and others fully remote. Some locals preferred working without the panel’s 
guidance or just using it to inform their conversations with the district. Counter 
intuitively there were school district plans that “passed review but [schools] 
began [the] school year remotely” or, despite getting a safety seal of approval, 
“the District announced that it would not start in-person instruction.”58 
 
A number of districts also were reluctant to embrace the ICAAP 
recommendations because they did not include a measurement that would 
trigger whether the learning plan would be hybrid, remote or fully in-person. The 
IEA and IFT eventually advocated for metric-driven tools that would shift 
reopening decisions from discretionary and subjective local community-driven 
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assessments to automatic and objective evidence-driven indicators rooted in 
public health policy. IFT President Dan Montgomery “call[ed] on the Governor 
and IDPH to establish and enforce clear metrics for schools to guide them for any 
future closures, so that individual districts and school boards can ensure safety 
within their communities and create plans for executing remote learning or in-
person instruction based on science and positivity rate data.”59 The initial 
response from the state teachers’ unions was to allow issues of reopening to be 
dealt with through direct negotiations between school districts and local unions. 
Arguably the best group of people to make decisions about reopening were those 
who actually worked in the 852 districts, but the practical effect was the 
emergence of 852 different plans. 
 
One curious missing element of a comprehensive virus mitigation strategy was 
the application of surveillance testing of students and staff. Following the CDC’s 
early guidance and the position of ISBE, IDPH, IASA, and the Illinois Association 
of School Boards, the state teacher unions did not advocate for surveillance 
testing of students and staff. Despite advocacy from medical colleges to conduct 
some form of surveillance testing for asymptomatic cases, school districts 
approached the beginning of the academic year without an available Covid-19 
testing service for their students and staff.60 Some districts had begun inquiring 
about the possibility of utilizing the University of Illinois after the Governor held 
an August press conference with the university president to announce a new 
diagnostic saliva test. The university was already using the test with its own 
students and employees. Pritzker noted that he intended to partner with the 
university to expand the test’s utilization across the state: “We’re already working 
to deploy this to more public universities across the state over the next weeks and 
months and exploring rolling this out to do testing potentially for K-12 schools 
and even more testing at our long term care facilities as well.”61 However, 
progress toward creating partnerships with the university, local laboratories and 
school districts never materialized. Consequently, well into the academic year 
school testing was all but absent in the state.62 Results from a survey by the 
National Association of Elementary School Principals revealed that nationwide 
less than one in five school districts had implemented Covid-19 testing for 
teachers.63 
 
Unions insisted on having safety protocols in place and called for adherence to 
public health guidance, even though adopting automatic red lines developed by 
county health departments or pediatricians or testing protocols would sacrifice 
employee autonomy. Most district plans did include a multi-layered safety 
strategy and a majority of schools were implementing nine or more measures.64 
But unless a school district used remote-only instruction, a fully prophylactic 
school environment was impossible. Teachers and superintendents were well 
aware of the conundrum. What if no amount of safety precautions were sufficient 
to make teachers or staff feel secure? What was the risk threshold for in-person 
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teaching? Was a risk-threshold even possible or reasonable to expect? Teachers 
wanted school districts’ decisions about reopening to be informed by medical 
guidance, but still insisted that local staff reserve the right to approve or modify 
the plan. 
 
IV.  School Reopening Plans 
 
Understanding the various options districts had for opening schools involves 
some nuanced explanation. There were three organizational and pedagogical 
approaches: fully in-person, fully remote, and a blended or hybrid (i.e., a mix of 
in-person and remote) arrangement.65 The in-person model is self-explanatory. 
While adhering to IDPH safety guidance, all students would attend their classes 
just as they had pre-Covid. A fully remote plan would mean that no students were 
physically attending school; instruction would be delivered either all online or as 
a mix of internet-based classes and weekly packets of printed out lessons. Further 
differentiating the online teaching model was the choice to use synchronous (live) 
or asynchronous (recorded) presentation methods. The blended model however, 
offered the greatest variation. 
 
ISBE broadly defined blended (or hybrid) classes as combining “some aspects of 
in-person learning with some aspects of remote learning,” but acknowledged that 
there “is no single blended learning model.”66 While no comprehensive account 
of implemented blended plans exists, the models available typically differed in 
the following basic ways: (1) the percentage of students learning in school 
buildings at the same time, (2) the number of days or hours per week students 
were physically in attendance, (3) the actual days and hours students attended, 
and (4) the subjects taught in the classroom, as opposed to delivered online. A 
blended model could even include in-person classes for some percentage of 
students, with others simultaneously participating through a livestream of the in-
person instruction. 
 
Blended models of instruction were common in higher education but had been 
rare for K-12 education. In response, ISBE organized a task force of educators to 
write a set of recommendations for implementing a partial online-traditional 
learning plan. At the end of July it published a 100-page manual that provided 
operational suggestions to “educators for implementing in-person, blended, 
and/or remote learning during the 2020-21 school year.”67 While the learning 
recommendations were driven by the practical need for remote and blended 
models, ISBE once more underscored what it really wanted to see from schools: 
“ISBE strongly recommends in-person learning but understands that during this 
unmitigated crisis intermittent closures may be unavoidable.”68 Both ISBE and 
IDPH agreed that in-person learning was the preferred teaching modality, but 
hedging against the reality of an uncontrolled community disease, the agencies 
acknowledged that it “may not be safe or feasible to fully resume in-person 
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learning in every school community.”69 The ISBE manual also made clear that as 
part of the reopening plans, districts were going to have to work with their 
unions, stating, “This document should not be interpreted to override the existing 
mutual obligations of the educational employer and the representative of the 
educational employees to plan at reasonable times and bargain in good faith with 
respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment that may 
need to be addressed in order to effectuate an appropriate learning model.”70 
 
District opening considerations were not only hindered by their lack of 
experience with something other than in-classroom instruction, they also had 
little authoritative understanding of how different models would impact the 
spread of the virus in schools. The probability of school building outbreaks if a 
district implemented some degree of in-person learning was nearly unknown 
during the run-up to September openings. Questions abounded: Would smaller 
classes reduce school spread among all grade levels? Would shutting a school 
down for a short while after an infection be safer than staying open in some 
reduced fashion? What type of operation would be the most effective at reducing 
infections? 
 
Following the beginning of the academic year, research emerged that strongly 
recommended a hybrid model. The study found that “[h]ybrid approaches where 
smaller groups of students wearing masks attend in person part-time 
dramatically reduce the total number of likely infections in a school. The models 
suggest that under a hybrid approach with precautions, most infections coming 
from outside the school will produce zero additional infections in the school.”71 
While the efficacy of a hybrid/blended opening affirmed what most districts in 
Illinois would ultimately implement, in July and August pedagogical decisions 
were principally based on state guidelines derived from knowledge about how to 
tamp down the community spread of an infectious disease. 
 
In the summer, Governor Pritzker requested that ISBE’s regional offices of 
education (ROEs) collect data on how school districts were planning to open.72 
The teacher unions had already surveyed their locals and developed a data bank 
of plans. Despite ISBE’s summer-long campaign to reopen schools, nearly twice 
as many students were learning fully remotely than were spending any time in 
classrooms. As September began, 1,253,533 students (65 percent) were in fully 
remote classes, while only 156,285 kids (8 percent) were fully in-person. Another 
531,825 were in blended settings (27 percent). More than half of the state’s public 
schools were in districts with completely remote plans, while roughly 13 percent 
were situated in districts opening up fully in-person.73 The student enrollment 
and school numbers inflated the remote preference because every large urban 
school district chose to open remotely. 
 
Examined by districts, the distribution was more equivalent; 30.6 percent went 
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fully remote (N = 260), while 41.6 percent of the plans were blended (N = 353) 
and another 27.7 percent (N = 235) were fully in-person. Disaggregated by 
whether any in-person teaching was in the opening plan, nearly 70 percent of 
districts selected some level of classroom teaching.74 By comparison, the 
proportion of Illinois’ districts opening in a blended/hybrid format (41.6 percent) 
was less than the number (51 percent) from a large national data set of 
reopenings, but higher (27.7 percent) than districts with full in-person classes (18 
percent). Illinois also had a higher degree of remote learning schools (30.6 
percent) than the national sample proportion (23 percent).75 
 
The enrollment differences between the districts based on their reopening plans 
were illustrative of the impact of size as a factor.76 Student enrollment and 
building space were primary determinants of school openings because a critical 
safety measure was to socially distance everyone. The standard school classroom 
is approximately 960 square feet of tables, desks, bookshelves, bulletin boards 
and supplies. In Illinois, the average class size is between 18 and 19 students 
depending on grade level, plus a teacher and likely at least one aide.77 However, 
class sizes of 27 to 30 are not uncommon. A standard full in-person class often 
provided no more than a three-foot perimeter of distance between students. For 
all but the exceptional school district, keeping a full classroom of students at least 
six feet apart was impossible. Schools were simply not constructed, nor were their 
budgets developed, to keep class sizes small. 
 
Statewide reopening plans revealed that districts that were providing full in-
person learning were mostly small. A little more than half of them (52.7 percent; 
N = 124) had between 50 and 500 students, serving 31,604 students. The average 
fully in-person school had only 152 students enrolled. School districts with an 
enrollment below 1000 students accounted for 80 percent of all the ones offering 
completely in-person instruction. Notably, only 47 (20 percent) of in-person 
districts had a minimum of 1,000 students and just three had an enrollment 
above 3,000. 
  
By comparison, fully remote school districts were on average considerably larger. 
School districts with enrollments between 500 and 3,000 students (N = 137) 
made up 53 percent of the districts teaching remotely. The average student 
population in these schools was 455, nearly three times as large as the schools 
with full in-person instruction. Almost three-quarters (72.5 percent) of the 
remote districts had a minimum of 1,000 students. Conversely, only 12 percent of 
remote districts had between 50 and 500 students while 35.3 percent (N = 92) of 
them had at least 3,000 kids enrolled. 
  
Blended districts were sized midway between the in-person and the fully remote 
districts. They had a little more than half the number of in-person districts in the 
50–500 students’ enrollment range, but more than double the number of the 
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remote districts. In districts with blended models, 54 percent (N = 191) of them 
taught between 500 and 2,000 students. The average enrollment of these schools 
is 362.8 students. Roughly 69 percent of blended schools have a student 
population between 500 and 5,000. Another 12 percent (N = 42) have 
enrollments of 3,000 or more.78 
 
There is also significant variation among school districts based on grade levels 
and ages taught. At the beginning of the school year, roughly 30,000 cases of 
Covid-19 involved individuals in Illinois under the age of 20.79 In DuPage County, 
for example, 65 percent of under-20 cases were in the 14–19 age range. By 
comparison, about one in ten infected individuals were younger than age 5.80 Age 
is a good proxy for grade level and whether districts were teaching high school 
students was a strong predictor of how they would reopen schools. For instance, 
only 3 percent (N = 8) of all districts were providing fully in-person teaching for 
grades 9–12. However, 20 percent (N = 51) of remote and 10 percent (N = 36) of 
blended districts were teaching high school students. Remote learning districts 
represented 52 percent of all the districts teaching high school students, while in-
person districts amounted to only 8 percent of grades 9–12 being taught. On the 
other hand, a far greater 21 percent (N = 66) of the districts serving preschool (3-
4 years) to 8th grade students were doing so in-person.81 Despite a higher district 
proportion, in-person elementary districts still accounted for just 9 percent of the 
preschool and elementary age students being taught at the start of the school 
year.82 
 
The preference for less than full in-person teaching among districts with high 
school students corresponded to medical reports, which found an increased risk 
of coronavirus exposure and infectious spread among older individuals.83 
However, as knowledge about the virus grew, epidemiologists and infectious 
disease scientists raised concerns about the capacity of even very young children 
to carry the virus. According to research cited in a New York Times article, 
“children younger than age 5 may host up to 100 times as much of the virus in the 
upper respiratory tract as adults, the authors found.”84 Legitimate and growing 
evidence that young kids played some role in community transmission of the 
virus likely explained why 44 percent (N = 135) of the districts educating 
elementary students opened remotely. Additionally, the vast majority of younger 
learners (62 percent) started school with full remote learning. 
 
Intersecting with the constraints of the health crisis was the inequitable level in 
which schools in Illinois are funded. In 2017 the state created a new funding 
process that allocated appropriations to schools based on local district financial 
capacity. The Evidence Based Funding (EBF) Model replaced a formula that was 
the most inequitable in the country.85 EBF arranged school districts into four 
“tiers” for purposes of state support according to their local capacity to fund 
education principally through property taxes: Tier 1 (furthest away from having 
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financial capacity), Tier 2 (next lowest financial capacity), Tier 3 (adequate 
capacity to fund), and Tier 4 (local resources greater than adequacy). State 
support would be highest for Tier 1 and lowest for Tier 4 districts.86  
School reopening plans bore modest correlation to community wealth.87 Tier 4 
school districts were more likely to open in-person (29.2 percent) than Tier 1 
(23.5 percent). Tier 1 and 4 districts also roughly equally selected remote plans 
(34.5 percent and 36.4 percent respectively). There was a slightly larger 
difference between the less well-resourced and better-financed school districts on 
their choice of a blended plan. Between 42 and 44 percent of Tier 1 and 2 districts 
opened with a blended model, while 38 percent of Tier 3 and 34 percent of Tier 4 
districts used a combination of in-person and remote teaching. 
 
Geography also explained school openings. A national data set of self-reporting 
schools revealed that there was a statistically significant relationship 
between “region-density” (i.e., urban, suburban, and rural jurisdiction) and the 
adopted “learning model.” In Illinois, urban school districts were far more likely 
to open fully remote, while suburban and rural districts were more strongly 
associated with some degree of in-person teaching.88 
 
Another important dynamic in school openings was the role that race played. A 
national survey of school openings revealed that race was a “strong predictor” of 
whether public schools were offering in-person instruction or not. The higher a 
district’s share of white students, the more likely it was to offer in-person 
instruction; a pattern that generally held across cities, towns, suburbs and rural 
areas. Across the surveyed districts, 79 percent of Hispanic students, 75 percent 
of Black students, and 51 percent of white students would not have the option of 
in-person learning.89 The choice of openings was influenced by how the virus had 
spread in different communities. Researchers found that Black and Hispanic 
Americans were roughly three times more likely than white residents to contract 
the virus. Infections took different paths depending on race. Hispanic and Black 
children were eight to five times respectively more likely than white children to 
be hospitalized. According to the Center for Disease Control, 80 percent of the 
children who died from Covid-19 by July, were children of color.90 
 
Covid’s “race gap” was starkly evident in the infectious rates and mortality counts 
in Chicago. The highest virus transmission and mortality rates were in city zip 
codes with the largest concentration of Black residents. They were also the 
poorest communities in the city. By midsummer Black residents made up roughly 
70 percent of Chicago’s Covid-19 deaths.91 Reflecting the national relationship 
between class status and race, Illinois’s openings were likewise closely associated 
with the racial composition of student enrollment. A district’s Black and Hispanic 
populations was moderately correlated with the type of opening. The larger the 
Black and Hispanic enrollment, the more likely the schools were to offer only 
remote learning.92 




Complicating the decision to reopen was the systemic problem of deferred 
building maintenance facing all districts. The average school nationwide needed 
more than $4.5 million worth of repairs.93 A 2018 survey of 350 school districts 
by ISBE and the Illinois Capital Development Board found that they had $3.8 
billion in structural repairs and HVAC capital needs to complete over the next 
two years. The cost per school district was a hefty $10.8 million.94 Extrapolated 
over the 852 school districts, there were about $9.2 billion in structural repairs 
and HVAC improvements needed across Illinois. Administrators, teachers, and 
parents all knew that, with some exceptions, education was not occurring in 
“healthy buildings.” In normal times many school districts and elected state 
officials tolerated substandard working and learning conditions. A pandemic, 
however, exposed the cherished school building as another point of conflict. 
 
Without sizeable funds to upgrade facilities, returning children and personnel to 
the classroom added risk. ISBE urged in-person attendance, but the state was not 
forthcoming with the capital dollars to retrofit schools. Districts needed to make 
structural improvements, but they would have to pay for them out of budget 
reserves. That’s if they had sufficient reserves, and very few did. On average, 
school districts had just 77 percent of the funding that ISBE established was 
necessary for a school to provide an adequate education. Only 14 percent had 
annual budget surpluses.95 Districts would spend heavily on PPE, but most would 
only make marginal upgrades to their schools’ ventilation systems. 
 
Covid-19 preparations were costly and public-school resources were further 
limited by the ways that federal allocation of pandemic relief dollars occurred. A 
study revealed that approximately 1,200 charter and 5,400 private schools 
received an estimated $5.8 billion in Paycheck Protection Program (PPP) loans. 
The average subsidy amounted to $855,000 per charter and private school. 
Contrarily, under the CARES Act 98,158 public schools were provided only $13.2 
billion, or $134,500 per school.96 The effect was that for every $1 public schools 
got, private and charter schools got $6. In Illinois, at least 551 “religious 
organizations”—many of them operating schools—received funding.97 
 
The redistribution of tax dollars away from public schools was further 
exacerbated under the federal Economic Injury Disaster Loan (EIDL) program. 
This program awarded loans to cover operating expenses and revenue losses to 
businesses affected by the pandemic. Just as the PPP defined a private or 
parochial school as a “non-profit,” EIDL was accessible to private and charter 
schools. In addition to PPP payments, hundreds of charter and private schools 
received $46 million. Siphoning money away from public schools occurred in yet 
another injurious fashion. In the spring, the U.S. Department of Education 
released guidance that directed public school districts to share their relief dollars 
with private schools in an unusual way. In the past, public schools had been 
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required to allocate a portion of their federal dollars to private schools based on 
the number of low-income private school students attending within the public 
school districts’ boundaries. However, Secretary of Education Betsy DeVos 
ordered a reallocation based on the private schools’ total enrollment numbers. 
Subsequently, Illinois directed its school districts to set aside the larger amount. 
 
The impact was significant. As reported, ten of Illinois’s largest public school 
districts were required to set aside a “combined total of $34.8 million in federal 
coronavirus relief for private schools within their boundaries.”98 Fearing the loss 
of approximately $10 million, Chicago Public Schools joined a multi-state lawsuit 
against the federal government, claiming the law intended that the money be 
distributed based on the number of low-income students. Two federal district 
court judges agreed and ordered the Department of Education to halt the 
distribution rule in the states and school districts that were a part of the lawsuit.99 
One judge declared, “An executive agency like the Department has no authority to 
rewrite Congress’s plain and unambiguous commands under the guise of 
interpretation.”100 
 
The federal redistribution of tax dollars away from public schools and the failure 
to pass a second relief bill with dedicated money for schools had negative 
consequences regardless of how districts opened. Common Covid-19 related costs 
were ubiquitous, but items varied some by school opening. For example, schools 
that opened in blended fashion had to assume additional costs for busing 
children. Next to staffing, transportation is one of the costlier items in a school 
budget. Nationwide school districts spend more than $25 billion a year 
shepherding kids to and from school.101 The costs were inflated in the fall because 
IDPH and ISBE guidelines limited the number of kids on a bus to 50.102 But the 
standard yellow school bus seats 66 pupils, which meant that it would be 
impossible to maintain social distances of six feet with 50 children on a bus. In 
response, IDPH and ISBE waived the six-foot rule for school buses.  
Remote learning—either fully or partially—meant technology upgrades, the 
purchase of laptops for students, and training for long-term substitute teachers. 
Districts that offered fully in-person instruction had to repurpose large spaces, 
conduct deep cleaning of buildings, and pay supplemental costs to teachers 
assigned to classes beyond their contracted workload. Wherever in-person 
teaching was happening, districts had to consider hiring medical personnel to 
handle Covid-19 cases specifically. Regardless of the added expense, teacher 
unions were important to the funding available. National research demonstrated 
that school districts with strong teacher unions generated higher school 
expenditures than areas with weaker unions. Increased spending on schools was 
also correlated with increased academic performance.103 
 
In addition to the structural elements that shaped school openings was a basic 
human relations question. Would teachers show up? Teachers repeatedly 
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asserted their desire to be back in school with their students. They also 
unmistakably indicated a strong concern about safety. Genuine strike threats 
were largely nonexistent, but districts were presented with union surveys 
expressing teacher worries about in-person learning and individual questions 
that revealed widespread staff anxiety. In the spring, when school doors quickly 
slammed shut, the pandemic did not shake Americans’ confidence in their public 
schools or teachers. Approval for both remained at or near peak levels.104 Social 
media posts filled up with expressions of gratitude hailing educators for their 
heroic service. But as fall approached, the thought that schools would remain 
closed caused a disquieting and self-serving shift in some public attitudes 
towards teachers. 
 
To encourage their return to the classroom, teachers were now being promoted as 
heroes. It was not how teachers commonly thought of their role, and seeing 
themselves described this way during a public health crisis raised alarm bells. 
Their commitment to students was unconditional. Parents, administrators, and 
elected officials knew all too well the mundane and sublime lengths that teachers 
would go in performing their duties. However, wrote one teacher in an op-ed in 
the New York Times: “It isn’t fair to ask teachers to buy school supplies; we aren’t 
the government. But we do it anyway. It isn’t fair to ask us to stop a bullet; we 
aren’t soldiers. But we go to work every day knowing that if there’s a school 
shooting, we’ll die protecting our students.”105 
 
Nonetheless, asking them to act like frontline healthcare workers or public safety 
officers when it was not clear that schools were safe places to be, seemed 
manipulative. One New York Times opinion writer warned that parents and 
teachers “would be wise to reject any invitation to unnecessary heroism” and that 
educating kids should not “be a heroic act of American defiance.” After noting the 
abject failure of the federal government to protect educators, he pushed back 
against the disingenuous hero narrative: “Teachers shouldn’t have to be heroes to 
do their jobs; educating our children should be heroism enough.”106 In reality, the 
efficacy of any plan to return kids to school was directly proportional to securing 
the requisite staff to teach. And at the end of the summer, districts were 
confronting unusual personnel challenges. 
 
Human resource heads had to assign teaching schedules as if they were 
assembling a giant puzzle, without knowing if they had all the pieces. One piece 
was hiring long-term substitute teachers while the country and Illinois were 
struggling with a growing shortage of people who wanted to pursue careers in 
education.107 Districts knew that their normal supplement of substitutes would be 
insufficient to fully staff an in-person school plan during a pandemic. The 
problem was aggravated because fear of classroom instruction had suppressed 
the number of applicants for substitute teaching positions.108 Some school 
districts increased both daily and long-term sub pay but still faced staff shortages. 
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A national survey found that nearly three-quarters of principals and district 
officials reported needing more substitute teachers than the previous year.109  
 
Filling staffing gaps was further complicated by five other personnel issues: 
teacher retirements, resignations, medical leaves, emergency family leaves, and 
unpaid leaves of absence. Compared to 2019, 33 percent of schools experienced 
an increase in teacher retirements.110 Another 36 percent saw an increase in the 
number of teachers who resigned or did not return their contracts. Non-returning 
teachers represented a loss to the school’s institutional knowledge and talent 
pool, but it was minor in comparison to the number of teachers who took medical 
leave. Six out of ten districts had to accommodate the absence of an increased 
number of full-time teachers due to a medical condition.111 School personnel also 
had a federal Covid-specific right to request paid family leave if their childcare 
provider or children’s school was closed.112 Ironically, a school’s ability to reopen 
in-person was entwined with neighboring school districts’ reopening plans. Also, 
in some states, teachers took unpaid leaves more than they had in normal years, 
and every district had to process multiple requests for possible breaks in 
teaching. 
 
Adding mind-bending complexity to the staffing conundrum was its susceptibility 
to change from one moment to the next. For example, the U.S. Department of 
Labor’s ruling that teachers could take paid leave on an intermittent basis created 
a situation whereby teachers were potentially unavailable to teach on the days 
when their own children were learning remotely or if they lacked childcare.113 Any 
district intending to open with in-person instruction would have to assess the 
cumulative impact of these missing instructors on staffing. 
 
A final and potent variable in school reopenings was the level of community 
spread between late August and early September. Many school districts had 
announced reopening plans in July, but with infection rates rising one month 
later, some that had prepped for in-person learning revisited their decisions.114 
Across the state nearly all counties experienced increasing positivity rates 
beginning in mid-August. Between August 28 and September 4, half the counties 
saw rates above IDPH’s 8 percent threshold for imposing tighter mitigation 
measures. The CDC, however, had defined a “hot spot” as an area with a 5 percent 
or greater infection rate.115 More than eight out of ten Illinois counties met the 
CDC designation, and 20 percent had rates above 10 percent. Counties with rates 
below 5 percent amounted to only 15 percent.116 Interestingly, no matter how 
prevalent the virus was in a community, there was no strong association between 
district reopening plans and positivity rates. In most counties, schools opened in 
multiple ways; very few had only one model. Infectious disease experts had 
recommended, and the teacher unions agreed, that schools should only open in 
communities with low virus spread. However, there was little evidence in Illinois 
that you could predict how schools were going to open by knowing the 
WINTER 2021 ILLINOIS PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RELATIONS REPORT 21 
 
 
community infection rates. 
 
V.  Risk-Averse Decision-Making 
 
Differences in community wealth, school building quality, student enrollment, 
and grades taught; reduced financial assistance; and parent preferences all 
contributed to a difficult environment for administrators and teacher unions to 
negotiate conditions for reopening schools. Yet, there was another major factor 
that severely hampered local decision making and strained labor relations: the 
lack of direction from health professionals on school reopening plans. The 
American Federation of Teachers published a reopening guide that in part called 
for mandatory social distancing, community-based testing, contact tracing, and 
“deploying the public health tools that prevent the virus’ spread, and aligning 
them with education strategies that meet the needs of students.”117 IDPH had 
encouraged school districts to work with their county health departments to 
combat the spread of the virus in schools, but except under conditions where the 
governor would revert to phase 3 of the Restore Illinois plan, IDPH was not 
assuming a directive role. 
  
But when the governor permitted schools to reopen, the health departments’ 
passive role put school districts in an untenable position. The 102 county health 
departments and the City of Chicago health agency had provided a blizzard of 
data on the virus to schools. However, none of it came with direction and all of it 
was conditioned as “guidance.” In the absence of a robust health department role, 
school superintendents and school boards throughout the state had to both 
prepare for the fall semester and make infectious disease mitigation decisions as 
a predicate for providing in-person instruction. The task was bedeviling for 
teacher unions and school administrators. Without an objective health standard, 
what was safe and how to determine it were subject to intense debate. 
Districts pointed out that urgent calls to restart in-person instruction had not 
been proportionately matched with the health directives or practices that could 
facilitate a safe return to classroom instruction. Consequently, school 
administrators and board members were compelled to make pandemic-level 
health decisions within a high-risk environment. Maximizing in-person learning 
meant they had to determine an opening model that could adapt to changing 
community infection rates while also minimizing disruptions to any in-person 
attendance. Throughout the summer, on weekly phone calls with their county 
health departments, superintendents complained that they did not have a 
definition of what was “safe.” School districts insisted that decisions on whether 
schools were safe to open for any level of in-person instruction had to be made by 
public health officials. However, IDPH and county health departments refused to 
do more than monitor and report coronavirus data. Frustrated with what school 
administrators saw as an inexplicable failure of responsibility on the part of state 
agencies, some districts took collective action.  
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On behalf of its member districts, the Legislative Education Network of DuPage 
(LEND) County sent a letter to the governor’s office.118 LEND was clear that 
school districts were not the institutions that should determine the pandemic-
level safety of a return to school plan: “ISBE, IDPH and the governor’s office have 
defaulted the actual decisions about reopening schools with some degree of in-
person instruction to educators, district administrators and part time unpaid 
school board members without any epidemiological expertise.” The letter went on 
to say that “school districts have developed very intricate and academically 
impressive plans for some degree of classroom teaching, but it remains to be seen 
whether any school opening can be done safely.” Thus, “[i]n the ongoing 
evolution of a pandemic it must be health professionals who decide whether 
bringing any level of staff and children into schools is warranted.” Demanding 
that school administrations act like medical professionals was not only risky; the 
void left by state health officials who balked at assuming responsibility for the 
decision whether to reopen schools threatened the collaborative relationships 
that many districts had with their employee unions. As LEND wrote:  
 
Forcing schools, administrators and boards, and their employee unions to 
negotiate MOUs on whether schools are safe to open places both parties in a 
mutually destructive situation. Neither is equipped or ethically empowered to 
make health and safety decisions about how to reopen schools during a global 
pandemic. At a time when school employees, administrators and communities 
need to be thoughtfully partnering to address learning challenges during a public 
health crisis, it is harmful to public education to be debating reopening plans 
based on interpretations of safety metrics outside the parties’ control.119  
 
By not providing a declaration of the safety of school plans, state agencies invited 
districts and their teacher unions to make individualized risk calculations. 
Lacking an informed expert judgment to rely on, teacher unions and 
administrators legitimately put forward and argued over contrasting risk levels 
about classroom teaching. Allowing risk assessments to be made at the individual 
or district level elevated the health fears of teachers and staff. Unable to obtain an 
objective recommendation of safety under highly uncertain conditions, the 
parties became incrementally more risk averse. Teachers and administrators 
were exhibiting what behavioral psychologists called “loss aversion.” While 
opening school with in-person instruction brought substantial “gain” to the 
students, the potential “loss” in student and staff health was greater.120 The result 
paradoxically was the opposite of what ISBE adamantly encouraged. Despite 
having developed models that included some in-person instruction, by the end of 
the summer, when community infection rates were accelerating, many school 
districts converted to fully remote learning. Some districts even did this after 
having collaboratively negotiated with their teachers to provide in-person 
learning. 
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The reality that schools were flipping from blended models that featured some in-
person instruction to fully remote plans, along with constant advocacy from 
superintendents, finally brought about a change in the health guidance. Roughly 
two weeks after LEND sent its letter, the DuPage County Health Department 
(DCHD) issued updated guidance titled, Return to School Framework. For the 
first time since the governor authorized schools to reopen, IDPH and its affiliated 
county health departments were providing “clarity on how and when schools can 
reopen for in-person instruction.” The new guidance recommended what school 
administrators had been demanding for months: health experts helping school 
districts deploy learning models based in part on the level of Covid-19 community 
transmission. Degrees of in-person learning would be safe at “minimal” or 
“moderate” levels of community transmission, but at “substantial” heights, 
DCHD encouraged “100% remote learning.”121 Classroom teaching would also 
require adhering to all CDC and IDPH safety guidelines. The framework was 
particularly instructive when evaluating school plans under “moderate” 
community transmission. It unambiguously stated that a plan where “[s]ome 
students participate in virtual and some participate in-person,” would be 
appropriate.122 The changed guidance had an immediate effect. DuPage County 
schools planning to open remotely began to discuss with their teacher unions 
implementing their previously developed blended plans.123 
 
While the details of a return to the classroom still required negotiation, there 
would no longer be an intractable interpretative debate over what the health 
experts considered safe. There was now a metric from which teachers and 
districts could reliably construct a return-to-school model. In the words of Aaron 
Carroll, professor of pediatrics at the Indiana University School of Medicine, the 
parties finally had a “functioning infrastructure to provide detailed and specific 
plans on how schools . . . can open and operate safely.”124 One superintendent 
approvingly noted, “In this model, the DCHD states schools can reopen in a 
hybrid learning scenario.”125 
 
VI.  Parent Voices 
 
Despite rising positivity rates, by late August, districts were under considerable 
pressure from their communities to reopen in-person. The same feeling of 
groundlessness pushing districts and teachers to demand more secure openings 
was driving parents to grasp onto the familiarity of normal schooling. Sending 
their children off to bricks-and-mortar schools was all that parents had ever 
known. The pandemic was scary, but schooling at home was outside their 
conceptual framework and, besides, the spring experience with e-learning had 
been unsettling. However, only a month earlier public opinion had been 
considerably cooler towards the idea of returning to school in person. In mid-July 
a super-majority of parents nationwide saw considerable risk in sending their 
kids to school in the fall. Most polling in June found that two-thirds of parents 
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favored full online learning and were considering “avoiding school buildings 
altogether.”126 One exception was a University of Michigan survey that included 
Illinois parents, which indicated that two-thirds of respondents would, if given 
the option, send their children to school for some in-person instruction.127 While 
the vast majority of parents were worried about their school-age children being 
exposed to coronavirus, Black and Hispanic parents expressed greater fear than 
white parents.128 Barely a third of non-white parents felt “personally safe” 
sending their children back to school any time in the fall for in-person classes, 
compared to 52 percent of white parents.129 
 
As the fall approached, and after Governor Pritzker’s return-to-school 
announcement, most school districts conducted some form of community survey 
asking parents about how they wanted their children to attend school.130 Parents 
were typically given a menu of choices that included having students attend 
school for the full day with some restrictions, attending half or alternating days 
while adhering to safety protocols, or participating fully online. It was common in 
suburban and rural communities to find upwards of 70 percent of parents 
preferring some form of in-person teaching. Research modeling had 
recommended that the best way to balance the preference to have kids in school 
with limited school virus transmission was to adopt a “hybrid” (i.e., blended) 
plan.131 However, the call to throw open the schoolhouse doors was not universal. 
Support for classroom teaching was dramatically lower in large urban school 
districts, like Chicago.132 Additionally, a majority of Black and Hispanic parents 
in suburban and urban communities were far more circumspect about in-person 
classes than white parents. 
 
Parent entreaties for classroom teaching were driven mostly by two worries: first, 
if schools remained closed, it would complicate fulfilling household employment 
obligations, and second, that remote learning was detrimental to their children’s 
development. Fears about lost income were not unwarranted. The inability to 
teach students in school buildings directly caused increased stress for Illinois 
working families. In the state, there are 2.1 million school-age children (0–12 
years old), including 928,000 children ages 5 and younger.133 More than 8 out of 
ten school-age children live in households with annual incomes of $150,000 or 
less.134 There are 1.6 million workers in the state who have at least one child 
under the age of 14.135 Nearly all (98 percent) of the 1.2 million children between 
the ages of 6 and 12 years-old in Illinois are enrolled in school and most are 
enrolled in the first grade through the fourth grade (56 percent). A little more 
than one-third (36 percent) are in the fifth grade through the eighth grade and 
the rest (6 percent) are in kindergarten. In 2020, approximately 640,100 
students were enrolled in grades 9–12.136 
 
Covid-19 school shutdowns exposed an unacknowledged work-school nexus. 
Schools are by purpose and design places of learning, but in practice, they are 
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also functionally a place to put kids so that parents can earn a living. Very few 
employees have any employer-provided, sponsored, or assisted childcare 
benefits.137 Therefore, the decision to reopen schools in the fall of 2020 had 
serious implications for households with at least one working parent. Schools are 
not day care facilities, and childcare is not their responsibility. Nonetheless, 
many parents demanded that their children attend school in-person because the 
parents worked outside the home and they did not have childcare or were 
burdened by the cost of childcare. Parents who were fortunate enough to have 
jobs that gave them the option of working from home during the pandemic still 
had reason to fear the repercussions for their careers of working alongside of a 
child schooling remotely. Single parents—mostly women—were placed in an 
especially dire predicament. Many could not work remotely and were confronted 
with two equally bad choices, leading to terrible outcomes. They either watched 
over their child learning at home and risked forfeiting their employment or left 
their child alone at home while they went to work and gambled on their kid’s 
intellectual development. Public schools had, in effect, provided an enormous 
subsidy to the employers’ cost of reproducing labor. If schools did not open, 
employers’ access to their workforce remained restricted. Likewise, many 
employees with children would be unable to maintain their employment. 
 
Parents also expressed considerable anxiety about the social-emotional harm to 
their children if they lost opportunities for social networking. The potential 
psychological impacts of not being able to be in school with peers, raised fears 
about children’s mental health. Additionally, medical professionals cautioned 
against prolonged limited access to critical support and assistance that normally 
was available when a child attended school. The American Academy of Pediatrics 
stressed that students “learn social and emotional skills at school, get healthy 
meals and exercise, mental health support and other services that cannot be 
easily replicated online.” Schools did much more than advance academic 
pursuits; they were “fundamental to child and adolescent development and well-
being.”138 Warnings of increased levels of childhood depression brought on by 
“social isolation” added to public concerns about closed schools.139 
 
Fears of academic learning loss were equally troubling. One survey taken after 
schools had briefly opened found that 38 percent of parents felt their children 
were learning less this school year.140 Teacher perceptions were far more 
worrisome; 83 percent perceived that their students were making less progress.141 
While surveys did not distinguish between learning models and perceptions, the 
assumption was that remote instruction was the primary driver of the findings.  
It is commonly accepted by educators that in-person teaching is the gold 
standard for school-age children. Virtual teaching had entered some schools 
before the pandemic, but with few exceptions it was only as a targeted option or 
supplement to actual classroom instruction. No one, not even the brashest 
advocates of virtual schools, ever expected remote learning to replace in-person 
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teaching.142 Consequently, when schools went to e-learning in the spring, 
concerns about learning setbacks came from teachers, school administrators, 
academics, and parents. Conventional wisdom held that being away from school 
would harm students cognitively and emotionally. However, there was little 
validated research comparing online to in-person learning at the K–12 level to 
substantiate the claims. Claims of learning loss mostly came from data that 
associated summer and chronic student absences from school with lower 
academic outcomes.143 The research findings on missed school days were strong, 
but their applicability to remote learning was tenuous. In the case of student 
absences, no instruction and contact with a teacher occurs. In contrast, 
instruction delivered remotely was still teaching and, if done synchronically, 
involved student-teacher engagement. 
 
Despite limited evidence of actual K–12 student performance, modeling 
estimates of learning loss contributed to public anxiety. They typically suggested 
that learning loss would depend on the quality of remote instruction, the length 
of time instruction was done remotely, and the degree of student-teacher 
engagement. One model predicted between three to 11 months of loss depending 
on the quality of remote instruction and whether schools operated remotely for 
only a part of or the entire 2020–21 school year.144 The overall prediction was 
alarming but dependent on adapting a model to a new situation. 
 
However, what was illuminating about the reports was that they revealed more 
about the structural inequities of schooling then they did about the potential 
pernicious effects of online teaching. A study of an online platform for math 
instruction during the spring closures concluded: “Children in high-income areas 
experienced a temporary reduction in learning” when schools shifted to remote 
instruction, “but soon recovered to baseline levels.” By contrast, “children in 
lower-income areas remained 50% below baseline levels persistently.”145 
Researchers also determined that in Illinois, progress in completing online math 
coursework increased from January 2020 to May 3, 2020 by 36.2 percent for 
students from higher-income zip codes but only 3.7 percent for kids in low-
income communities.146 Another projection claimed that students were likely to 
“return in fall 2020 with approximately 63–68% of the learning gains in reading 
relative to a typical school year and with 37–50% of the learning gains in math.” 
It all sounded deeply worrying. Yet, the most profound aspect of the study was 
that the “estimate of losing ground during the Covid-19 school closures would not 
be universal, with the top third of students potentially making gains in 
reading.”147 
 
While not part of the reopening time sequence, a nationwide fall 2020 study of 
nearly 4.4 million test scores from grades 3–8 revealed the disproportionate 
anxiety that remote learning generated over the summer. Compared to fall 2019, 
in fall 2020 “most students showed growth in both reading and math 
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achievement since the onset of COVID-19 disruptions, but growth in math was 
lower than in a typical year.” Additionally, when compared to testing that 
immediately preceded the spring 2020 school shutdowns, “in almost all grades, 
most students made some learning gains in both reading and math since the 
COVID-19 pandemic started.”148 Student growth materialized at different rates by 
subject matter and grade. Educators expected some learning loss but the 
evidence that students were suffering from significant learning regression was 
spotty. 
 
Projections about closed schools and remote instruction reinforced the standard 
K–12 fault lines. Online students from higher-income households outperformed 
remote students from lower income families on standardized tests. Black and 
Hispanic students learning virtually did less well on high-stakes tests than their 
white counterparts. High-performing kids in standard school settings would be 
high-performing kids in online formats. Students learning at or below grade level 
in classrooms would learn at or below grade level online. The fall 2020 data also 
reinforced the systemic inequities. As noted in the research “a sizable population 
of the most vulnerable students were not assessed in fall 2020” and “declines 
were concentrated disproportionately among Hispanic and Black students in the 
upper elementary grades.”149 
 
In other words, remote learning appeared to reproduce outcomes that mirrored 
what in-person teaching generated. Regardless of how students were being 
taught, class inequities and racial bias were strongly associated with student 
achievement. Parents, elected leaders, and state education officials who preached 
the benefits of opening schools because of equity issues were the same ones who 
had passively tolerated opportunity gaps among students in classroom 
environments. A recognition that schools would be dependent on online 
instruction may have explained why 54 percent of parents thought schools should 
spend more time ensuring that online instruction was “high quality rather than 
figuring out how to reopen schools for in-person instruction.”150 
 
School opening plans also had to take into consideration the opportunity costs of 
shifting learning models. Administrators and teacher unions were faced with 
crafting a decision in the summer with little assurance about the course of the 
virus’ transmission. There was no confidence that health conditions at play in 
early September would be the same two or even one month later. Districts had to 
consider the effects of having to change plans, perhaps more than once in the 
school year. 
 
District superintendents, teachers, and parents strongly preferred a stable plan. 
Pivoting back and forth for brief (usually two weeks) or extended periods severely 
stressed staffing arrangements, created havoc for parents, and unsettled 
students. However, the constant urging from ISBE, IDPH, and Governor Pritzker 
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to send kids back to school subjected teachers and district leaders to a peculiar 
parental criticism if they chose to open with remote learning. The complaint was 
that schools should open in-person because they were likely to close later. The 
thinking went that because district leaders could anticipate that health conditions 
would worsen in light of a predicted cold weather virus surge, schools should 
have opened while it was relatively safer. But the criticism was flawed on its face.  
It was impossible to compute the possible future scenarios of the virus in the 
current moment. Asking administrators and teachers to make a decision at the 
beginning of the school year because they supposedly knew what the conditions 
would be six to eight weeks later was faulty reasoning. Even an assumption that 
positive Covid-19 cases would increase over time did not necessarily support a 
decision to open with an in-person model. First, acting like schools were going to 
be or likely would be permanently in-person, while knowing that they would not 
be a few weeks later, would have signaled conflicting expectations to everyone. If 
districts knew at the start of the academic year that schools would later likely go 
fully remote a short while later, then choosing remote at the beginning of the year 
was a better long-term strategy. Although state officials wanted all students back 
in school, bringing everyone back at the beginning of the year only to force them 
into remote settings later would have been highly disruptive. 
 
In developing their plans, schools faced two overarching dimensions: one of 
stability and instability and another of certainty and uncertainty. By choosing to 
start remotely, schools prioritized stability and certainty. If virus cases subsided, 
schools could confidently prepare to return to in-person instruction at an 
appropriate date. If, however, they had started with full or reduced in-person 
learning and transmissions increased, causing districts to suddenly, haphazardly 
pivot (by their nature health emergency shutdowns would be immediate) to 
remote instruction, it would have created an immense amount of instability and 
uncertainty. Contrarily, by choosing to open remotely, schools would potentially 
lose some period of in-person learning, but in a situation where county health 
officials were recommending only remote instruction, they would gain year-long 
scheduling stability. Furthermore, they would attain the certainty of a hopefully 
high-quality remote teaching plan to use, potentially, for the majority of the 
school year. 
 
Parents preferred that their children be taught in classrooms, but they also 
embraced the need for stability and certainty. They joined teachers and 
administrators in objecting to alternating schedules and learning modalities. One 
national survey revealed that a majority of parents “would rather my child’s 
school stick to a consistent plan for whether students receive remote or in-person 
learning throughout the year, rather than changing gears based on the number of 
coronavirus cases in my area.”151 Only 34 percent preferred that their schools 
adjust plans depending on coronavirus cases in their communities.152 
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The critique was also based on an incorrect understanding of the course of the 
virus. By late August or early September, infection rates were rising across the 
state. Districts appropriately adjusted their reopening plans to reflect increased 
health risks by pushing back a return to in-person instruction to mid-late October 
or the first week in November. The decisions proved wise as community spread 
began to fall, hold steady, or slowly inch upward throughout the months of 
September and October. In nearly every county, the course of the virus took the 
shape of a U with the later peak of the ramp occurring between November 13–20. 
Not surprisingly, a number of schools with in-person learning announced a brief 
“adaptive pause” until after the Thanksgiving break or a return to full remote 
teaching until January.153 
 
VII.  MOUs, Strikes, and Legal Remedies 
 
Decisions about school reopening had an impact on the wages, hours, and terms 
and conditions of employment of school staff. Consequently, collective bargaining 
was the principal process used to develop school reopening plans. In some cases, 
the bargaining resulted in a signed memorandum of understanding between 
unions and districts; at other times, the union’s input was used to develop a 
district’s comprehensive reopening plan. Unions also backstopped their 
negotiations with threats of “safety” strikes and legal action. 
 
In negotiating plans to return to work in the fall—whether in person, blended, or 
fully remote—unions and districts grappled with a panoply of issues, including 
telework/remote instruction opportunities; modifications of workplaces to 
include social distancing; barriers, spacing, and positioning of desks and 
workstations; disinfecting and cleaning procedures; personal protective 
equipment; virtual participation in a wide range of workplace events; 
accommodations for employees with serious health conditions that increase the 
risk of serious illness or death; and other CDC-recommended mitigation 
measures. Paraprofessional staff were asked to perform duties that were widely 
outside of their job descriptions but necessary for the efficient operation of the 
school, such as temperature checks, technology distribution, and “deep cleaning.” 
Even in districts where students were learning remotely, many required their 
teachers to teach from their empty classrooms instead of from home. 
 
Further complicating matters, the parties had to bargain virtually, which 
introduced a new dynamic to the relationship. Some of the negotiations resulted 
in signed memoranda of understanding (MOUs), but others were simply 
incorporated into the particular district’s return to work plan. MOUs are legally 
binding agreements, but unlike Collective Bargaining Agreements (CBAs), MOUs 
are often used in bargaining negotiations to address temporary situations. 
 
A review of dozens of plans between districts and IFT or IEA local unions show 
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that nearly all contained detailed health and safety protocols, including 
guidelines for the use of face masks in interior spaces and during remote 
learning, and the provision of personal protective equipment to staff in positions 
that may be at a higher risk of infection.154 But beyond that common element, the 
agreements diverged greatly, reflecting the specific concerns of the district and 
local union about reopening. For districts planning remote instruction, plans 
focused on the instructional expectations of teachers, outlining the hours they 
would spend teaching remotely,155 the technology they would use,156 and 
procedures for time away from the computer.157 In cases where districts were 
planning in-person instruction, the plans dealt with temperature checks,158 the 
distribution of N95 masks to certain staff,159 classroom configurations,160 and 
reimbursement of medical expenses resulting from work with unmasked 
students.161 Blended openings required negotiating in-person and remote 
schedules,162 recording teacher lessons, 163 and livestreaming of classrooms.164 
 
The plans also dealt with issues that could seem mundane to most, but were 
important to teachers, such as workarounds for required teacher evaluations,165 
the use of a sick leave bank,166 and, in one case, the possibility of a voluntary year-
long leave of absence.167 It is clear from a review of these MOUs that trust was 
being built between the parties around staff and student safety, but the unions 
were still concerned about being forced into unsafe situations amid a growing 
chorus of voices pushing for schools to fully reopen in the fall for in-person 
learning.168 In places where the parties could not agree, unions started to explore 
other legal options. 
 
Though the concept of a “safety strike” was discussed as a possibility for unions 
facing the possibility of schools that schools would reopen without concern for 
staff or student safety, it is likely that such a strike would be illegal under the 
Illinois Educational Labor Relations Act (IELRA). Under the IELRA, unions must 
pledge not to strike during the term of a collective bargaining agreement in 
exchange for the binding arbitration of grievances.169 And even for expired 
contracts, the IELRA requires that mediation be used without success and that 
the parties engage in a public posting of offers, which many unions would not 
have had time to undertake in the weeks before school was set to reopen.170 
 
In districts where the parties could not come to an agreement, unions were left to 
consider an illegal “wildcat strike” or some kind of legal strategy that could keep 
schools from reopening for in-person learning until crucial health and safety 
concerns were resolved. The general shortage of personnel who have the requisite 
license, education, and desire to work in education meant that unionized teachers 
were unlikely to be replaced if they struck. But in most cases, the specter of 
withholding services was not what teachers and staff realistically wanted. They 
knew that students (and parents) craved normalcy. However, the teachers and 
staff wanted to work in an environment that had proper safeguards in place and 
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where their employer followed the advice of the CDC, IDPH, and local health 
department. 
 
Though Covid-19 is novel to unions, fighting for the health and safety of their 
members is not. As unions began to think through their response to some school 
districts’ plans to return to in-person learning without proper safeguards in place, 
workers looked to the ways that the law could provide protection. Unions have 
implemented creative strategies in the past, using the courts to bring litigation 
around safe and adequate classrooms. These cases relied on unfair labor practice 
actions, provisions in state constitutions, as well as state workplace safety laws 
and other tort claims. While this litigation was brought in circumstances where 
the school facilities were dilapidated and unsafe, the legal theories and 
precedents were adaptable to address the dangers posed by the coronavirus. The 
options could (and in some places did) foreclose in-person learning until schools 
had the adequate safety standards in place. 
 
The IELRA requires parties to a collective bargaining agreement to bargain “in 
good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of 
employment.”171 While unions commonly file unfair labor practices over a failure 
to bargain, they on occasion seek injunctive relief, which the Act allows in very 
limited situations when “just and proper.”172 Teacher unions brought seven such 
actions in the fall of 2020 and winter of 2021 seeking injunctive relief.  
The first case involved a university, but it set the stage for the six K–12 cases that 
followed.173 In Western Illinois University, the IELRB granted the union’s 
request for preliminary injunctive relief under Section 16(d) of the IELRA on a 
charge alleging that the university violated the IELRA by publicly announcing 
that it was returning to face-to-face classes during the Covid-19 pandemic 
without bargaining with the union.174 The Board granted the injunction in this 
case, because “ordinary IELRB remedies, such as backpay, would not be adequate 
to remedy the irreparable harm resulting from the potential spread of COVID-
19.”175 After the IELRB voted to “enjoin the University from resuming face to face 
instruction until it has bargained in good faith with the Union over its decision 
[to do so,]” administrators and union leaders bargained nearly around the clock 
to produce an agreement that would allow for a safer reopening.176 
 
Importantly for future cases, the Board in Western found that requiring 
employees to be physically present for face-to-face instruction during the 
pandemic is a mandatory subject of bargaining because it is a health and safety 
issue. Acknowledging that it had not directly addressed the issue of employee 
safety as a mandatory subject of bargaining, the IELRB relied upon National 
Labor Relations Board and Illinois Labor Relations Board cases in determining 
that there was good cause to believe that the union would succeed in its argument 
that employee safety is a mandatory subject of bargaining.177 
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The precedents established in the Western Illinois University case were used a 
few weeks later in a school district that was attempting to require teachers to 
come to school but continue to teach remotely from their classrooms, just as 
community cases were beginning to climb in the early fall. In Proviso, the IELRB 
granted the union’s request for preliminary injunctive relief under Section 16(d) 
of the IELRA in a charge alleging that the employer violated Section 14(a)(5) of 
the IELRA by requiring bargaining unit members to be physically present in 
schools during a pandemic to teach remotely, without having first bargained in 
good faith with the union over its decision.178 Prior to the start of the school year, 
the parties entered into an agreement that allowed bargaining unit members the 
choice of where to teach remote learning. About a month into the school year, the 
superintendent directed all bargaining unit members to teach from their 
classrooms as their students continued to learn remotely. Bargaining unit 
members returned to schools only to discover that the schools had no heat or hot 
water and that many rooms had not been cleaned. In addition, the union alleged 
that school administrators failed to wear masks. Shortly after the IELRB’s 
decision to grant injunctive relief, the district reversed its decision and allowed 
staff to teach remotely. 
 
Similarly in Cicero, the IELRB granted injunctive relief where it found that the 
Cicero School District had not bargained in good faith about school reopening 
plans.179 The Cicero Board of Education also sought an injunction in circuit court 
under Section 13(b) of the IELRA, which allows employers to seek injunctive 
relief against striking employees in circuit court.180 The district argued that the 
teachers’ refusal to return to work under its plan constituted a strike, but the 
judge found that the teachers were indeed not on strike and were continuing to 
teach remotely, and therefore could not be enjoined from continuing to reach 
remotely.181 Cicero schools stayed fully remote for another month until the union 
and administration reached agreements on a safe reopening plan. 
 
However, unions were not entirely successful in seeking injunctive relief in cases 
with disputed facts or where the unios could not proffer facts showing that the 
IELRA was likely violated. The IELRB denied injunctive relief to teachers and 
paraprofessionals in Elmhurst, where the Board found the union had not clearly 
demanded to bargain over the aspects of the school’s reopening plan that it 
sought to have the IELRB enjoin.182 And in Chicago, where the Chicago Teachers 
Union filed three charges against Chicago Public Schools, alleging violations of 
the IELRA by refusing to negotiate in good faith over a safe school reopening plan 
and acting unilaterally in all its decisions. In all three cases, the IELRB denied the 
union’s request for preliminary injunctive relief, primarily because critical facts 
about whether the employer had engaged in bad faith bargaining were in dispute, 
and therefore the union could not show a substantial likelihood of success on the 
merits; and in one case because the union asked for “hazard pay” as opposed to 
ordinary remedies.183 Despite the losses at the IELRB, the Chicago Teachers 
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Union was able to win a comprehensive school reopening agreement, which 
included testing protocols, measures that might lead to reclosing schools, and 
vaccination commitments. Among other things, the union succeeded in 
negotiating accommodations for hundreds more members at higher risk of 
Covid-19 complications, or who serve as the primary caregiver for someone at 
higher risk, than the district had originally agreed to accommodate.184 
 
In late December, it seemed evident that vaccines would be widely available by 
the summer and that the 2021–22 school year could start mostly in person, albeit 
with some additional safeguards in place. Yet, even with normalcy on the horizon, 
cases continued to rage over the winter. Despite that, schools that mostly opened 
remotely in the fall faced increased pressure to shift to in-person learning in the 
spring semester. While most teachers and staff were eager to return to in-person 
learning, they were not willing to do so if their employers were not enforcing 
layered mitigation policies. As one teacher’s sign said, in a widely-shared post on 
social media, “I can’t teach if I am dead.” It’s not clear if teachers were aware of 
the accumulating number of school personnel who had died from the virus since 
the outbreak, but by mid-September one count of reported school fatalities had 
hit 650.185 
 
In addition to seeking injunctive relief, unions began exploring other legal 
remedies when fighting for safe classrooms. One such option was a public 
nuisance tort claim. In Illinois, there is a public right to be free from an 
environment that may endanger public health.186 Illinois courts have found that 
public health includes monitoring the spread of infectious diseases.187 If the 
union can show that an employer is not sufficiently protecting worker safety, the 
union can go directly to court for an injunction requiring the employer to enforce 
health and safety rules.188 The court may mandate that the employer follow 
proper protocols and may even mandate that the school switch to remote 
learning until the appropriate safety protocols can be met. This legal theory was 
used successfully in the summer in a case brought by the Fight for Fifteen against 
several McDonald’s restaurants that were not following public health guidelines. 
The court ordered that McDonald’s enforce its mask and training policies.189 
 
Illinois’s Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA) also provides several 
options for unions. First, the law imposes a duty on public employers to “provide 
reasonable protection to the lives, health, and safety of its employees and must 
furnish to each of its employees employment and a workplace which are free from 
recognized hazards that cause or are likely to cause death or serious physical 
harm to its employees.”190 Unions could file an action under this “general duty 
clause” where employers are not conforming to public health guidelines. They 
could also instruct their members that they have an individual right to refuse to 
work where a reasonable person would agree that there is a real danger of death 
or serious injury. This option is somewhat limiting for unions because the safety 
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statute does not provide a collective right to refuse work, so an individual’s 
refusal to work in dangerous conditions would not allow everyone in the 
workplace to walk out. 
 
Finally, the Illinois OSHA statute allows the Director of the Illinois Department 
of Labor (IDOL) to go to circuit court to seek the abatement of any imminent 
danger.191 Local unions, in conjunction with the IFT and IEA, could pressure the 
Director of IDOL to initiate such an action if school districts were not willing to 
abate dangers prior to the return of staff and students. 
 
Additionally, although ISBE has been reticent to exercise any direct authority 
over a school district’s plans for in-person instruction, it does have the authority 
to do so. The School Code section on school standards allows ISBE to determine 
“efficient and adequate standards for the physical plant, heating, lighting, 
ventilation, sanitation, safety, equipment and supplies, instruction and teaching, 
curriculum, library, operation, maintenance, administration and supervision, and 
to issue, refuse to issue or revoke certificates of recognition for schools or school 
districts pursuant to standards established hereunder.”192 It would be possible, if 
ISBE was not enforcing the school transition plan standards they established in 
conjunction with the IDPH, for a local union to bring an action for mandamus to 
compel ISBE to act. Indeed, the IFT and IEA called on the state legislature and 
ISBE to “[e]nforce guidance and requirements put forth by the Illinois 
Department of Public Health (IDPH) and the Illinois State Board of Education 
(ISBE) and heed the recommendations of the Centers for Disease Control 
(CDC).”193 
 
Finally, unions could seek relief more locally. Local health departments have 
authority to close schools “in an emergency” and have done so during other 
epidemics, such as the avian flu.194 Unions could talk to their county health 
departments and raise concerns about reopening and discuss under what 
circumstances the health department would close the school. 
 
VIII.  Conclusion 
 
In the fall of 2020, schools reopened approximately at the point that the spread 
of coronavirus began to curve upward. They went back into session under various 
formats and procedures. Despite being urged by state health, education, and 
government officials to get kids into classrooms, most districts offered no or 
reduced in-person instruction. Districts opened with a lot of guidance, but little 
direction. They were shown a multitude of changing Covid-related numbers but 
were left to interpret a maze of terms and unfamiliar data. Schools would need to 
spend millions on safety measures but got insufficient financial relief from 
Washington and nothing from the state. Millions of people were supposed to 
walk into ageing school buildings without first testing kids and staff for 
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infections. Parents wanted their kids sitting in school desks, teachers wanted to 
work safely, and nobody would say how or even if those two things could occur. It 
was within this cauldron of confusion, fear, pressure, and need that school 
districts relied on collective bargaining to open schools. 
 
Meetings between administrators and teacher unions led to formal MOUs and 
codified school opening plans. Teacher unions submitted membership survey 
results and pediatric panel evaluations on the safety of opening plans to school 
boards. They filed legal action to influence the ways that plans were 
implemented, made public appeals when safety was ignored, and threatened to 
strike if necessary. Superintendents staffed in-person and remote classrooms 
according to CBAs and MOUs. Human resource managers abided by the 
provisions of teacher contractual leave rights, federal Covid-19 related sick and 
emergency time off policies, and legitimate health accommodation requests. 
 
Not every local situation was harmonious, but whether affirmatively agreed to or 
passively accepted, school openings happened within the obligations of labor-
management relations. Size, resources, location, grade level, and community 
infection rates were factors in school plans, but each element was grist for the 
formal or informal bargaining mill. Districts opened with blended, full in-person, 
or remote instruction because the people managing and working within the 
schools determined the model they would use. They had no choice really; a void 
had been created. State health, education and political officials offered only 
recommendations and prompts to reopen. By insisting that schools put kids in 
classrooms while also abiding by safety restrictions, state officials handicapped 
the bargaining process. Under high uncertainty and severe limitations districts 
would be left to decide on school openings. Nonetheless, administrators and 
teacher unions came to terms on how to do what labor relations never anticipated 
having to do. Educating children during a pandemic. 
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By Student Editorial Board: 
 
Enrique Espinoza, MaryKate Hresil, Nicholas Lira Lisle, Erin Monforti 
 
I. IELRA DEVELOPMENTS 
 
 Duty of Fair Representation 
 
In Ibrahim-Smith and Cook County College Teachers Union, Local 1600 IFT-
AFT, 37 PERI 50 (IELRB 2020), the IELRB affirmed the Executive Director’s 
dismissal of the charging party’s charge that the union had breached its duty of 
fair representation in its handling of her grievances. Ibrahim-Smith filed 
grievances challenging her demotion and separation from her employment as a 
Technology Integration Specialist with City College of Chicago. Charging party 
criticized the union for suggesting that she contact the Office of Inspector General 
to file an anonymous complaint, for delaying by three weeks the filing of her 
grievance and for a purported delayed or lack of communication. The IELRB held 
that there was no evidence that the union’s actions were motivated by 
vindictiveness, discrimination, or enmity. Consequently, charging party failed to 







In City of Country Club Hills v. Charles, 2020 Ill. App (1st) 200546 (Dec. 24, 
2020), the First District Appellate Court held that an arbitration award reducing 
to a written warning a police officer’s discharge for dishonesty would have to be 
vacated because it was contrary to public policy. 
  
During the summer of 2017, Officer Derrick Charles of the City of Country Club 
Hills Police Department was disciplined for two discrete incidents. In late June, 
Charles was required to file a detailed report of an incident involving a detainee’s 
escaping the police building after Charles had left the door open to the booking 
room and had failed to lock his firearm in an adjacent gun locker. When he filed 
his report on the incident, Charles omitted information related to his forgetting 
to lock the booking room door and his carrying a weapon into the room, which 
was designated a secure area where no firearms were allowed. The police chief 
found that Charles had failed to provide the requisite detail in his report because 
of these omissions. The second incident, in late August, involved Charles’s failure 
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to report to a notoriously raucous nightclub despite its being common practice to 
do so and his commanding officer’s alleged instruction for Charles’s unit to report 
to the club. An investigation into this matter found that Charles’s squad car was 
parked in an abandoned parking lot, and that the vehicle was turned off for 
nearly an hour during that time, which disallowed him from hearing his police 
radio. Charles claimed that he was writing reports and monitoring traffic, claims 
that were not verified with any finished reports or appropriate GPS activity, 
respectively. 
 
The police chief filed charges against Charles for submitting an incomplete and 
untruthful report related to the June escape incident, failing to follow a superior 
officer’s order by not reporting to the nightclub in August, and lying about his 
activities while he sat in the abandoned lot instead of reporting to the club. Upon 
the police chief’s decision to terminate Charles, his union grieved and arbitrated 
under the collective bargaining agreement (CBA). The arbitrator found that there 
was insufficient evidence to find that Charles was being untruthful by omitting 
details from his report of the June escape incident and found that discipline 
would be unnecessary for the nightclub incident. The arbitrator ultimately found 
that the City could issue a written warning for Charles’s failure to lock the 
booking room door and secure his weapon, but ordered that Charles be 
reinstated. 
 
The City brought a complaint in the circuit court to vacate the arbitration award 
under the narrow public policy exception, arguing that discharge was the only 
sufficient discipline to impose on Charles. The parties filed cross-motions for 
summary judgment, and the circuit court granted Charles’s motion, entering an 
order affirming the arbitration award. 
 
On appeal to the Appellate Court for the First District, the City argued that a 
penalty less than discharge was contrary to public policy. Despite the Court’s 
recognition that the Uniform Arbitration Act, 710 ILCS 5/1–23 substantially 
limits avenues for judicial review of arbitration awards, it vacated the award 
under the two-step analysis outlined in City of Chicago v. Fraternal Order of 
Police, 2020 IL 124831, and Department of Central Management Services v. 
American Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees (AFSCME), AFL-
CIO, 197 Ill. App. 3d 503; 554 N.E.2d 759 (1990). Under this analysis, a court 
first inquires whether a clearly defined and strong public policy can be identified 
in constitutional, statutory, or judicial authority before determining whether the 
award in question violates the public policy. 
 
The court identified a strong public policy in the State of Illinois requiring policy 
officers to be honest, which has been made clear through a collection of judicial 
decisions at the appellate level. The court found that honesty and integrity are 
vital, not only given police officers’ role in their communities, but also given the 
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expectation that police officers be credible witnesses if called to testify in a 
criminal or civil matter. The court also found that the arbitrator’s award violated 
public policy based on the evidence presented regarding Officer Charles’s 
misconduct and dishonesty. The court reasoned that Charles’s reinstatement 
would “. . . creat[e] the possibility that his credibility as a witness w[ould] be 
undermined for the remainder of his career, and would encourage other officers 
to be dishonest when doing so would benefit them. . . .” In dicta, the court 
recognized that not every case of officer dishonesty would require a penalty of 
discharge, but that an intensive fact-based inquiry would be required to establish 
appropriate discipline. 
  
Justice Cunningham wrote a dissenting opinion, indicating her disapproval of 
what she considered a judicial overstep of a binding arbitration agreement 
between the City and Charles’s police union. She further opined that the findings 
of the arbitrator were sufficiently reasonable, and that the imposition of a penalty 
of discharge was in error because it impermissibly substituted the court’s 
judgment for that of the arbitrator, who was presented with firsthand evidence 
during the arbitration. This substitution, in her opinion, was unwarranted given 
how narrow the public policy exception is meant to be applied in assessing 
arbitration awards in Illinois. 
 
III. Community College Act Developments 
 
Reductions in Force 
 
In Barrall v. Bd. of Trustees of John A. Logan Cmty. Coll., 2020 IL 125535 (Dec. 
17, 2020), the Illinois Supreme Court held that section 3B-5 of the Public 
Community College Act (Act) (110 ILCS 805/3B-5 prohibits a community college 
from laying off tenured faculty members and then, within the statutory recall 
period, hiring adjunct instructors to teach courses that the laid-off faculty 
members are competent to teach. 
 
The issue arose when, in 2016, twenty-seven tenured faculty members received 
layoff notices as set forth in the Act. In September 2017, the plaintiffs petitioned 
the Williamson County Circuit Court for a writ of mandamus, arguing that the 
Board of Trustees had violated section 3B-5 of the Act. 
 
Plaintiffs alleged that during the 2016-2017 school year, the Board employed 
adjunct instructors to teach courses that plaintiffs had previously taught, while 
maintaining in layoff status most of the twenty-seven tenured faculty members. 
 
The Circuit Court granted the College’s motion to dismiss. Plaintiffs appealed. 
The Appellate Court reversed and remanded. The College petitioned for leave to 
appeal, which was granted. The Supreme Court of Illinois affirmed the Appellate 
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court judgment and remanded the case. The plaintiffs based their claims on the 
last sentence of the Section 3B-5 of the Act:
 
For the period of 24 months from the beginning of the school year for 
which the faculty member was dismissed, any faculty member shall have 
the preferred right to reappointment to a position entailing services he is 
competent to render prior to the appointment of any new faculty member; 
provided that no non-tenured faculty member or other employee with 
less seniority shall be employed to render a service which a tenured 
faculty member is competent to render. (emphasis added) 
 
The court reasoned that the first sentence gives an existing faculty member rights 
against a new faculty member. The second clause gives a tenured faculty member 
rights against a nontenured faculty member and an “other employee with less 
seniority.” 
 
As a general matter, when there is a reduction in force in a public workplace that 
operates under a seniority system, workers with greater seniority whose jobs are 
abolished have the right to displace, or bump, workers with less seniority from a 
position for which both are qualified. 
 
Under the court’s analysis, adjunct instructors are considered “other employees 
with less seniority” than tenured faculty members. Also, within the Act’s 
meaning, tenured faculty members have a right to displace or bump adjunct 
instructors from individual courses (rather than teaching positions per se). The 
court concluded that the Board had employed adjunct instructors—other 
employees with less seniority than plaintiffs—to render a service, namely, to 
teach a course or courses that plaintiffs were competent to render, was a violation 
of section 3B-5 of the Act. 
 
In a dissenting opinion, Chief Justice Anne Burke expressed her concerns about 
the majority decision’s effect; in her view, it will compromise community colleges’ 
ability to manage a budget crisis when the solution requires layoffs.  
 
IV. First Amendment Developments 
 
 Fair-Share Fees 
 
In Ocol v. Chicago Teachers Union, 982 F.3d 529 (7th Cir. 2020), the Seventh 
Circuit held that (1) Chicago Public Schools Teacher Joseph Ocol (Ocol) was not 
entitled to a refund for past compulsory fair-share payments to unions—the 
Chicago Teachers Union (CTU) and American Federation of Teachers (AFT); and 
(2) exclusive representation provisions of the Illinois Educational Labor 
Relations Act (IELRA) did not violate Ocol’s First Amendment rights. 




Ocol—a math teacher with Chicago Public Schools—filed a putative class action 
lawsuit, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 28 U.S.C. § 220, against CTU and AFT, 
as well as the Illinois Attorney General and members of the Illinois Educational 
Labor Relations Board (IELRB). Relevant before the Seventh Circuit was whether 
Ocol was entitled to recovery of union dues made in protest over several years. 
The district court dismissed and granted summary judgment to the defendants, 
and the Seventh Circuit affirmed. 
 
Ocol was a member of CTU from 2005 until 2016, when he was expelled for 
refusing to participate in a one-day strike on April 1, 2016. Thereafter, Ocol 
remained, at the time, obligated to pay fair-share dues, pursuant to Section 5/11 
of the IELRA, and 115 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5 et. seq., which authorized unions and 
public employers to include in their collective bargaining agreements a fair share 
clause “requiring employees covered by the agreement who are not members of 
the organization to pay the organization a fair share fee for services.” Ocol 
continued to make these payments until 2018, when the Supreme Court in Janus 
v. AFSCME Council 31, concluded that extraction of such fees from non-union 
members violated those employees’ First Amendment Rights. 138 S. Ct. 2448, 
2478 (2018). 
 
On appeal, Ocol reasserted constitutional challenges to past payments of fair-
share fees to the unions. However, Ocol admitted that Janus v. AFSCME Council 
31 (Janus II), 942 F.3d 352, 367 (7th Cir. 2019), precluded any argument that he 
was entitled to a refund. The Seventh Circuit contended that, like the plaintiff in 
Janus I, Ocol had paid fair-share fees under protest and sought recovery.  
However, in Janus II, the Seventh Circuit held that a private party acting under 
the color of state law, for 42 U.S.C. § 1983 purposes, was entitled to a good-faith 
defense, which was applied to union collection of fair-share fees. In Janus II, the 
court ultimately held the plaintiff was limited to declaratory and injunctive relief, 
and a future free of any association with a public union. This Court held the same 
for Ocol with regard to the refund entitlement assertions. 
 
Ocol raised other constitutional challenges to the exclusive representation 
provision of the IELRA. The court held, likewise to the refund assertion, that the 
“exclusive representation [challenge] goes nowhere.” Ocol argued the exclusive 
representation provision violated his First Amendment rights by restricting his 
right to bargain as an individual for the terms and conditions of his own 
employment. The Seventh Circuit pointed out Ocol’s acknowledgment that prior 
precedent foreclosed any viable claim, referring to the decision in Minnesota 
State Board for Community Colleges v. Knight, 465 U.S. 271, 104 S. Ct. 1058 
(1984), where the Supreme Court specifically rejected a similar claim (upholding 
a provision of the Minnesota Public Employment Labor Relations Act that 
precluded non-designated faculty representatives from bargaining directly with 
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college employers). The court in Ocol further reasoned that the Court, in Janus, 
had given no indication that its ruling on fair-share fees undermined the system 
of exclusive representation. See Janus I, 138 S. Ct. at 2467 (noting that union's 
duty of fair representation to both members and nonmembers continues despite 
elimination of fair-share fees because benefits of exclusive representation “greatly 
outweigh any extra burden imposed by the duty of providing fair representation 
for nonmembers”). 
 
For the aforementioned reasons, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the decision of the 
district court that Ocol was not entitled to fair-share payment refunds nor that 
the exclusive representation provision of the IELRA violated Ocol’s First 
Amendment rights, in favor of the defendants. 
